What if Artificial Intelligence Wrote This? Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law by Palace, Victor M.
Florida Law Review 
Volume 71 Issue 1 Article 5 
What if Artificial Intelligence Wrote This? Artificial Intelligence and 
Copyright Law 
Victor M. Palace 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Victor M. Palace, What if Artificial Intelligence Wrote This? Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law, 71 
Fla. L. Rev. 217 (). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 
217
WHAT IF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WROTE THIS? 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Victor M. Palace† *
Abstract
The increasing sophistication and proliferation of artificial 
intelligence has given rise to a provoking question in copyright law: Who 
is the copyright owner of a work created by autonomous artificial 
intelligence? In other words, when a machine learns, thinks, and acts 
without human input, and it creates a work, what person should own the 
copyright, if any? This Note explains why this is a pressing question and 
why current laws and practices fail to address the issue. It then analyzes 
the arguments for and against the possible choices: the artificial 
intelligence, the user, the programmer, the company that owns the 
artificial intelligence, and entrance into the public domain. Finally, this 
Note arrives at the conclusion that the work’s immediate entrance into
the public domain is the solution.
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INTRODUCTION
It is the dawn of a new era: the era of artificial intelligence.1 For 
millions of years, the human brain has been the most complex and most 
powerful machine in the world. Analytical reasoning, imagination, and 
intuition have allowed humans to thrive and rise to the top. Indeed, 
society has long recognized the value of the human intellect by affording
legal protection to intellectual creations. The Founding Fathers protected 
intellectual creations under the Patent and Copyright Clause of the United
States Constitution, which seeks “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2 As 
complex and powerful as the human brain is, however, current 
technology is sometimes able to match, if not surpass, its capabilities. 
This has led to a provoking question in copyright law: Who is the 
copyright owner of a work created by autonomous artificial intelligence?
To answer this, an example of “autonomous artificial intelligence” is
helpful. Imagine artificial intelligence that does not require any human 
input to learn, think, or act. Like a baby, it starts out utterly naïve and 
incapable of doing anything of substance. It tries to perform a task and 
fails, but—much like a child—it learns. This repeats over and over. After 
some time, not only has the machine mastered the task, it has become one 
of the world’s best.
This is the story of AlphaGo Zero, the first artificial intelligence to 
learn tabula rasa—meaning from a “clean slate,” without any human 
                                                                                                                     
1. This Note uses “artificial intelligence” to refer to a computer algorithm capable of 
accomplishing tasks that generally require human intelligence, such as creating pictures, songs, 
and writings. See Artificial Intelligence, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxford
dictionaries.com/definition/us/artificial_intelligence [https://perma.cc/XEW2-YVKA] (defining 
“artificial intelligence” as “[t]he theory and development of computer systems able to perform 
tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, 
decision-making, and translation between languages”).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2
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input.3 AlphaGo Zero started out with no prior knowledge of the game 
Go except for its rules.4 Nonetheless, after forty days of playing against 
itself, it outperformed the algorithm that defeated the world’s best human 
Go player.5 This is the type of artificial intelligence on which this Note 
focuses. For purposes of this Note, “autonomous artificial intelligence” 
is artificial intelligence where the only human inputs are the initial 
algorithm and the “rules”; the machine performs the learning, thinking, 
and acting. Legal tension arises from the fact that it is not immediately 
clear who owns the copyright of a work created by such a machine.
To resolve this, Congress and the federal courts may choose to grant 
the copyright for such works to the artificial intelligence, the user, the 
programmer, or the artificial intelligence company. Or they may choose 
to grant no copyright at all; that is, they may choose to place such works 
into the public domain immediately upon creation, where everyone would 
be free to use them. This Note explains why this tension is a pressing 
issue, why current copyright law fails to address it, and why the last 
choice, immediate entrance into the public domain, is the solution.
Part I explains why Congress or the federal courts will soon have to 
make this choice. It provides a brief historical outline and current 
developments regarding computers to conclude that the sophistication of 
artificial intelligence will continue to increase. This Part also discusses 
the increasing popularity of artificial intelligence to highlight the urgency 
of the issue. It concludes that the continuing increase in sophistication 
and popularity of artificial intelligence will soon force Congress or the 
federal courts to act.
Part II explains why current copyright law fails to address the 
question. It discusses congressional silence, judicial reluctance, and the 
Copyright Office’s rules. This Part then explains why the only source of 
guidance, the Copyright Office’s rules, is based on law that is blind to the 
issue. It concludes that the Copyright Office’s rules are ambiguous and 
antiquated and thus fail to properly answer the question.
Part III explains the arguments for and against the possible choices: 
the artificial intelligence, the user, the programmer, the company that 
owns the artificial intelligence, and entrance into the public domain. It 
then compares the arguments to conclude that immediate entrance into 
the public domain is the answer.
                                                                                                                     
3. See Demis Hassabis & David Silver, AlphaGo Zero: Learning From Scratch,
DEEPMIND, https://deepmind.com/blog/alphago-zero-learning-scratch/ [https://perma.cc/8LYX-
JSSN].
4. Id.
5. Id.
3
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I. CONGRESS OR THE FEDERAL COURTS WILL SOON BE REQUIRED TO 
SAY WHO OWNS THE COPYRIGHT FOR WORKS MADE BY AUTONOMOUS 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
This Part explains the urgency of the copyright ownership question 
for works created by autonomous artificial intelligence. To do this, it 
discusses two ever-increasing aspects of artificial intelligence: 
sophistication and popularity.
A. The Sophistication of Artificial Intelligence Will Continue 
to Increase
In 1965, the Register of Copyrights reported to Congress his concerns 
about computer-generated work.6 The report stated that the rise of 
computer technology brought with it a difficult copyright question: For a 
work that is partly generated by a computer, where is the line between 
human and computer authorship?7 Apparently perturbed by the question, 
Congress established the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to research, among other things, 
this issue.8 At the time, CONTU found the answer “obvious” because 
artificial intelligence had not yet come to be.9 It stated that a “computer, 
like a camera or a typewriter, is an inert instrument, capable of 
functioning only when activated either directly or indirectly by a 
human.”10 Thus, CONTU argued, the copyright always belonged to the 
user.11 However, the technological landscape has change dramatically 
since then.
By the 1980s, computer-generated works had become popular.12 By 
the 1990s, computers were capable of originality. For example, Racter,13
                                                                                                                     
6. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 5 (1965), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1965.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E55P-XEUF].
7. See id.
8. National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Pub. L. No. 
93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
9. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 44–45 (1978), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015026832934 [https://perma.cc/RUA7-AT2J].
10. Id. at 44.
11. Id. at 45.
12. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated 
Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (1986) (stating that in 1986 “there [was] no question but 
that many machine-generated works [were] already available, and that in the future they [were] 
expected to become ever more complex, sophisticated and valuable”).
13. See Terry Nasta, Thief of Arts, PC MAG., Dec. 25, 1984, at 62, https://books.google.
com/books?id=azbgSlPdJawC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA62 [https://perma.cc/38HU-FMQ9] (reviewing 
RACTER, THE POLICEMAN’S BEARD IS HALF CONSTRUCTED (1984)).
4
Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss1/5
2019] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT LAW 221
a computer program designed to generate prose and poetry,14 wrote the 
book The Policeman’s Beard is Half Constructed.15 Similarly, Hal,16 a
computer program designed to write like American author Jacqueline 
Susann,17 co-wrote the book Just This Once.18 Finally, Creativity 
Machine,19 itself a patented device,20 created an invention that was later 
patented.21 Nowadays, artificial intelligence is present in almost every 
aspect of daily life, including travel-booking,22 psychological therapy,23
and even legal work.24 Not surprisingly, “45% of 800 executives 
surveyed . . . said they expected an artificial intelligence machine will sit 
on a company’s board of directors by the year 2025.”25 Likewise, “[35%]
of surveyed law firm leaders say they can envision first-year associates 
being replaced by artificial intelligence . . . and [47%] said they can 
envision paralegals being replaced.”26 And perhaps most interestingly, 
“[c]ombined results from surveys of artificial intelligence experts 
                                                                                                                     
14. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01[A] 
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2018) (1963).
15. RACTER, THE POLICEMAN’S BEARD IS HALF CONSTRUCTED (1984).
16. See John Boudreau, A Romance Novel with Byte: Author Teams Ups with Computer to 
Write Book in Steamy Style of Jacqueline Susann, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1993),
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-11/news/vw-22645_1_jacqueline-susann [https://perma.cc/
J2ZL-TTBK].
17. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14; Tal Vigderson, Note, Hamlet II: The Sequel? 
The Rights of Authors vs. Computer-Generated “Read-Alike” Works, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401, 
402–03 (1994).
18. SCOTT FRENCH & HAL, JUST THIS ONCE (1993).
19. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of 
Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2016).
20. See U.S. Patent No. 5,659,666 (filed Oct. 13, 1994).
21. See U.S. Patent No. 5,852,815 (filed May 15, 1998).
22. See Elaine Glusac, Meet Your New Data-Driven Travel Agent, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/travel/meet-your-next-travel-agent-diy-artificial-
intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/59BN-RNBP].
23. See, e.g., Gale M. Lucas et al., It’s Only a Computer: Virtual Humans Increase 
Willingness to Disclose, 37 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 94, 94 (2014).
24. See Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-
intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/AF5Y-8BC6].
25. Lucy Marcus, Is This a Truly Robot-Proof Job?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20150921-is-this-a-truly-robot-proof-job [https://perma.cc/
S9VZ-VM24].
26. Debra Weiss, Will Newbie Associates Be Replaced by Watson? 35% Of Law Firm 
Leaders Can Envision It, ABA J. (Oct. 26, 2015, 7:42 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/will_associates_be_replaced_by_watson_computing_35_percent_of_law_firm_lead/
[https://perma.cc/V4S9-52TV].
5
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estimate a 50% chance of human-level machine intelligence by 2040 and 
a 90% probability by 2075.”27
Although current technology seems to be approaching the physical 
limit of computational power per unit area (a trend called “the end of 
Moore’s law”28),29 experts nonetheless believe that computational power 
will continue to increase due to breakthroughs in other areas of computer 
engineering.30 Moreover, the advent of “quantum computing”31 is 
expected to revolutionize artificial intelligence—Microsoft, for example, 
has stated that its artificial intelligence would learn at least “30 times 
faster” as a result of quantum computing.32 In short, artificial intelligence 
will continue to become more and more sophisticated, increasingly 
blurring the line between human and computer authorship, until Congress 
or the federal courts are forced to act.
B. Works Created by Artificial Intelligence Are Everywhere 
Due to the tremendous advances in artificial intelligence, works 
subject to copyright laws are now regularly created by autonomous 
algorithms. This is prominent in three areas: music,33 pictures,34 and 
                                                                                                                     
27. Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated 
Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 256 (2016).
28. “Moore’s law” is named after Gordon E. Moore, who predicted that the number of 
transistors per chip (which is proportional to computational power) would double every two years. 
See Thomas L. Friedman, Moore’s Law Turns 50, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/opinion/thomas-friedman-moores-law-turns-50.html
[https://perma.cc/2CEF-KHFN].
29. See Thomas N. Theis & H.-S. Philip Wong, The End of Moore's Law: A New Beginning 
for Information Technology, 19 COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING 41, 41 (2016).
30. See id. at 44 (commenting that research will simply switch from miniaturization to new 
devices, integration techniques, and architectures).
31. “Quantum computing” refers to the use of subatomic particles in computing instead of 
conventional silicon-based transistors. See Quantum Computer, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/quantum_computer [https://perma.cc/7HKQ-Z8YG].
32. Allison Linn, With New Microsoft Breakthroughs, General Purpose Quantum 
Computing Moves Closer to Reality, MICROSOFT (Sept. 25, 2017), https://news.microsoft.com/
features/new-microsoft-breakthroughs-general-purpose-quantum-computing-moves-closer-
reality/ [https://perma.cc/VQL2-6YVK].
33. Musical works have long received the protection of copyright laws. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(4), (6) (2012) (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted 
[musical] work publicly”).
34. As with musical works, pictorial works have long been protected by copyright laws. 
See, e.g., id. § 106(5) (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to display the copyrighted 
[pictorial] work publicly”).
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writings.35 The first category is music. Watson Beat,36 Jukedeck,37 and 
WaveNet38 are examples of artificial intelligence systems capable of 
creating music without any human input.39 Watson Beat, for example, 
“composes music by ‘listening’ to at least 20 seconds of music, and then 
creates new tracks.”40 The results are tracks that cost a fraction of what 
hiring a musician would, and the tracks can be used as background music 
for videos, games, and commercials.41 A famous example of Watson 
Beat’s work is the song Not Easy,42 which was created by Grammy-
nominated producer Alex da Kid in collaboration with Watson Beat.43
“Watson Beat . . . looked at composition of [over 26,000 Billboard Hot 
100 songs] to find useful patterns between various keys, chord 
progressions and genres.”44 Then, Alex would issue commands to 
Watson Beat like, “[g]ive me something that sounds romantic,” or, “give 
me something that sounds like something I want to dance to.”45 Watson 
Beat would then produce an “original piece” that Alex would use as 
inspiration.46
The next category is pictures. DeepDream47 is an example of artificial 
intelligence capable of creating original pictures without human 
                                                                                                                     
35. As with musical and pictorial works, literary works have long received the protection 
of copyright laws. See, e.g., id. (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to display the 
copyrighted [literary] work publicly”).
36. See Kelly Shi, Beats by AI, IBM RES. (July 27, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/
blogs/research/2016/07/beats-by-ai/ [https://perma.cc/S32U-8LBP].
37. See About, JUKEDECK, https://www.jukedeck.com/about [https://perma.cc/3LN8-887X].
38. See Aäron van den Oord et al., WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw Audio,
DEEPMIND (Sept. 8, 2016), https://deepmind.com/blog/wavenet-generative-model-raw-audio/
[https://perma.cc/9HW6-AY72].
39. See Alex Marshall, From Jingles to Pop Hits, A.I. Is Music to Some Ears,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/arts/music/jukedeck-artificial-
intelligence-songwriting.html [https://perma.cc/S5B7-KPQ9].
40. Shi, supra note 36.
41. See Marshall, supra note 39.
42. ALEX DA KID, NOT EASY (KIDinaKORNER 2016), https://open.spotify.com/album/
4K6Zqkm3dZQncMmunPIl9O [https://perma.cc/8RWQ-UNFQ] (stream through Spotify).
43. See A Collaboration by Alex Da Kid + IBM Watson, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/
watson/music/noteasy/ [https://perma.cc/5VZQ-GTBX].
44. Id.
45. IBM Cognitive Business, Alex Da Kid and Watson Make Music Together, MEDIUM 
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/cognitivebusiness/alex-da-kid-and-watson-make-music-together
-c251908c1bca [https://perma.cc/4JXZ-8LHC].
46. Id.
47. DEEP DREAM GENERATOR, https://deepdreamgenerator.com/ [https://perma.cc/4ZAZ-
4TX7].
7
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direction.48 In a nutshell, DeepDream analyzes a photograph, guesses 
what it is, and then enhances certain features based on the guess.49 The 
results are “haunting, hallucinogenic imagescapes”50 that resemble the 
original photographs but are nonetheless uniquely different.51 Moreover, 
DeepDream is able to create pictures seemingly out of nothing by 
interpreting images of random noise, zooming in, and interpreting and 
zooming in repeatedly.52 The results are dream-like pictures that are 
purely the product of DeepDream’s artificial intelligence.53
The final category is writings. Automated Insights54 and Narrative 
Science55 are two companies that allow customers to create automated 
narratives, “many with no human intervention.”56 The following is an 
example of Narrative Science’s work, which describes the third quarter 
of the 2011 game between the Wisconsin Badgers and the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas, (UNLV) Rebels:
Wisconsin appears to be in the driver’s seat en route to a win, 
as it leads 51-10 after the third quarter.
Wisconsin added to its lead when Russell Wilson found 
Jacob Pedersen for an eight-yard touchdown to make the 
score 44-3. The Badgers started the drive at UNLV’s 28-yard 
line thanks to a Jared Abbrederis punt return.
A one-yard touchdown run by Montee Ball capped off a two-
play, 42-yard drive and extended Wisconsin’s lead to 51-3. 
The drive took 42 seconds. The key play on the drive was a 
41-yard pass from Wilson to Bradie Ewing. A punt return 
gave the Badgers good starting field position at UNLV’s 42-
yard line.
A 69-yard drive that ended when Caleb Herring found 
Phillip Payne from six yards out helped UNLV narrow the 
                                                                                                                     
48. See Alexander Mordvintsev et al., Inceptionism: Going Deeper into Neural Networks,
GOOGLE RES. BLOG (June 17, 2015), https://research.googleblog.com/2015/06/inceptionism-
going-deeper-into-neural.html [https://perma.cc/YQ5X-2NE9].
49. See Cade Metz, How A.I. Is Creating Building Blocks to Reshape Music and Art, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/arts/design/google-how-ai-creates-
new-music-and-new-artists-project-magenta.html [https://perma.cc/QLQ8-VLSR].
50. Id.
51. See Mordvintsev et al., supra note 48.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. AUTOMATED INSIGHTS, https://automatedinsights.com/ [https://perma.cc/2AZX-C2BY].
55. NARRATIVE SCI., https://narrativescience.com/ [https://perma.cc/KE96-YAHW].
56. Shelley Podolny, Opinion, If an Algorithm Wrote This, How Would You Even Know?,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/if-an-
algorithm-wrote-this-how-would-you-even-know.html [https://perma.cc/S4VN-Q29U].
8
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deficit to 51-10. The Rebels threw just three passes on the 
drive.
UNLV will start the fourth quarter with the ball at the 41-
yard line.57
Such works have become very popular. The Associated Press, for 
example, uses Automated Insights to produce more than 3,000 financial 
reports per quarter, and Forbes uses Narrative Science for similar 
efforts.58
In conclusion, due to the increasing popularity and sophistication of 
artificial intelligence, Congress or the federal courts will soon be required 
to declare the copyright owner of works created by autonomous artificial 
intelligence.
II. CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAWS FAIL TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF 
COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP FOR WORKS MADE BY AUTONOMOUS 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
This Part explains why current copyright laws fail to adequately 
address the copyright ownership question. To do this, it analyzes three 
types of sources: Congress, the federal courts, and the Copyright Office.
A. Congress and the Federal Courts Have Yet to Address Autonomous 
Artificial Intelligence
Congress has remained silent on the issue of artificial intelligence, and 
there appears to be only one recent action on the topic. In May 2017, 
Congress recognized that “[a]rtificial intelligence is no longer science 
fiction” and established the Artificial Intelligence Caucus.59 The Caucus 
is designed “to inform policymakers of the technological, economic and 
social impacts of advances in AI and to ensure that rapid innovation in 
AI and related fields benefits Americans as fully as possible.”60 Without 
more, however, this action fails to provide guidance as to copyright 
ownership for works made by autonomous artificial intelligence. 
                                                                                                                     
57. FINAL: Wisconsin 51, UNLV 17, BIG TEN NETWORK (Sept. 1, 2011), http://btn.com/
2011/09/01/first-quarter-wisconsin-20-unlv-0/ [https://perma.cc/9WD5-F28D]; accord Steve 
Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-gaining-traction.
html [https://perma.cc/69W5-PHN4].
58. Podolny, supra note 56.
59. Press Release, John K. Delaney, U.S. Congressman, Delaney Launches Bipartisan 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) Caucus for 115th Congress (May 24, 2017), https://delaney.house.gov/
news/press-releases/delaney-launches-bipartisan-artificial-intelligence-ai-caucus-for-115th-congress
[https://perma.cc/DHW6-7A24].
60. Id.
9
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Similarly, federal courts have yet to face a copyright case involving 
artificial intelligence. The only case that has addressed nonhuman 
authorship is Naruto v. Slater.61 There, a monkey named Naruto took 
pictures of itself using photographer David Slater’s camera, and Slater 
subsequently published the pictures in a book.62 The People for Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA) sued Slater for copyright infringement, 
alleging that Slater’s display, advertisement, and sales of the book 
violated Naruto’s copyright.63 The court dismissed the case, holding that 
Naruto lacked standing because “[an animal] is not an ‘author’ within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act.”64 Therefore, Naruto stands for the 
proposition that works created by animals belong to the public domain.65
Although this holding is a useful starting point, it fails to squarely 
address autonomous artificial intelligence. Importantly, works created by 
animals lack users, programmers, and companies that could be deemed 
the copyright owners. Indeed, it was the idea of granting standing to an 
animal that troubled the court in Naruto.66 Because works made by 
autonomous artificial intelligence have users, programmers, and 
companies—who could theoretically have standing—this judicial 
precedent fails to properly address the question of copyright ownership 
for such works. 
In sum, Congress and the federal courts have yet to address the issue 
of copyright ownership for works made by autonomous artificial 
intelligence.
B. The Copyright Office’s Human Authorship Requirement Fails to 
Properly Address Autonomous Artificial Intelligence
In arriving at its holding, the court in Naruto deferred to the Copyright 
Office.67 It noted that “[w]hen interpreting the Copyright Act, the courts
defer to the Copyright Office’s interpretations in the appropriate 
circumstances.”68 The court accepted the Office’s Human Authorship 
Requirement, discussed below, without discussion.69 Because Congress 
                                                                                                                     
61. No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016), aff’d, 888 F.3d 
418 (9th Cir. 2018).
62. Id. at *1.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *4.
65. See id.
66. See id. at *3 (“[I]f Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of 
authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said 
so plainly.” (quoting Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004))).
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 
1041 (9th Cir. 2014)).
69. Id.
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or a federal court could similarly rely on the Office’s requirement when 
addressing a work made by autonomous artificial intelligence, a thorough 
analysis of the Office’s requirement is due.
The Copyright Act70 states that a copyright shall be granted for an 
“original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,” yet it does not define “authorship.”71 Nonetheless, the Office 
has established the Human Authorship Requirement, which states that 
“[t]o qualify as a work of ‘authorship’ a work must be created by a human 
being.”72 That is, “the Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines 
that a human being did not create the work.”73 The requirement’s 
application is straightforward in the context provided by the Office. For 
example, the Office states that it will refuse to grant a copyright for 
“driftwood that has been shaped . . . by the ocean”74 because no one 
contributed to the creative process.75 However, in the context of 
autonomous artificial intelligence, this requirement is ambiguous and 
antiquated and thus fails to properly address the copyright ownership 
question. 
First, the Office’s application of the Human Authorship Requirement 
is ambiguous with respect to autonomous artificial intelligence. The 
Office states that it “will not register works produced by a 
machine . . . that operates randomly or automatically without any 
creative input or intervention from a human author.”76 While this rule 
seems to encompass artificial intelligence, the examples provided by the 
Office make this unclear. As to music, the Office states that it will not 
register the result of “[t]ransposing a song from B major to C major”;77
however, Watson Beat, Jukedeck, and WaveNet, do more than just 
transpose songs as they are able to renovate styles and create new 
tracks.78 As to pictures, the Office states that it will not register the result 
of “a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces irregular
                                                                                                                     
70. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
810 (2012)).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added); see id. § 101.
72. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 
(3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY7T-
G6KE]. It should be noted, however, that the Compendium is not binding and does not have the 
force and effect of law. It merely “provides instruction to agency staff regarding their statutory 
duties and provides expert guidance.” Id. intro., at 1.
73. Id. § 306.
74. Id. § 313.2.
75. See id. § 306.
76. Id. § 313.2.
77. Id.
78. See Marshall, supra note 39.
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shapes in the fabric without any discernible pattern”;79 however, 
DeepMind does more than just create irregular patterns as it is able to 
create landscapes from random noise images.80 As to writings, the Office 
fails to provide an example.81 Therefore, the application of the Human 
Authorship Requirement to autonomous artificial intelligence is 
ambiguous.
Second, the support behind the Human Authorship Requirement fails 
to acknowledge autonomous artificial intelligence and is thus antiquated. 
To support the requirement, the Office quotes language from two cases: 
In re Trade-Mark Cases82 and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony.83 The Office states:
The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual 
labor” that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Because 
copyright law is limited to “original intellectual conceptions 
of the author,” the Office will refuse to register a claim if it 
determines that a human being did not create the work. 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 
(1884).84
First, it must be noted that both cases are more than a century old, 
meaning they predate the advent of computers by more than half a 
century.85 Therefore, their technological contexts shed no light on 
copyright ownership for works made by autonomous artificial 
intelligence. Moreover, a close inspection reveals that the cases serve as 
a poor foundation for the broad bar against nonhuman authorship.
The Office cites Trade-Mark Cases for the proposition that “copyright 
law only protects ‘the fruits of intellectual labor’ that ‘are founded in the 
creative powers of the mind.’”86 In Trade-Mark Cases, three trademark 
infringers challenged the constitutionality of the federal trademark 
statutes.87 The prosecution offered two sources of constitutional power: 
                                                                                                                     
79. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72.
80. See Mordvintsev et al., supra note 48.
81. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72.
82. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
83. 111 U.S. 53 (1884); see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306.
84. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306.
85. The Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), first revealed in 1946, is 
considered the first computer. See Frank da Cruz, Programming the ENIAC, COLUM. UNIV.
COMPUTING HIST. (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/eniac.html
[https://perma.cc/F34E-GYNP].
86. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306 (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82).
87. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 91–92.
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the Patent and Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.88 In relevant 
part, the Supreme Court held that trademarks were not “writings” under 
the Patent and Copyright Clause because
while the word [“]writings[”] may be liberally construed, as 
it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, 
[etc.], it is only such as are original, and are founded in the 
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be 
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the 
form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. The trade-
mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something 
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party 
using it.89
Therefore, Trade-Mark Cases stands for the proposition that Congress 
cannot regulate trademarks under the “writings” language of the Patent 
and Copyright Clause.90 Because trademarks have little in common with 
works made by nonhumans, this case serves as a shaky foundation for the 
Office’s broad rule.91 Moreover, the Court in Trade-Mark Cases
emphasized originality.92 This indicates that as long as the autonomous 
artificial intelligence’s work is original enough—“books, prints, 
engravings, and the like”93—the Court would deem it “writings” under 
the Patent and Copyright Clause and thus copyrightable. Therefore, the 
Office’s ban against nonhuman works is antiquated in light of Trade-
Mark Cases.
Next, the Office cites Burrow-Giles for the proposition that “copyright 
law is limited to ‘original intellectual conceptions of the author.’”94 In 
Burrow-Giles, photographer Sarony sued lithographic company Burrow-
Giles, alleging copyright infringement of Sarony’s photograph of Oscar 
Wilde.95 Burrow-Giles retorted that because photographs merely 
reproduced people and objects, they were neither “writings” nor created 
by an “author” under the Patent and Copyright Clause.96 The Supreme 
Court held that they were:
                                                                                                                     
88. See id. at 93–95.
89. Id. at 94 (emphasis added and omitted).
90. See id.
91. See Abbott, supra note 19, at 1100–01 (“[I]t seems unwise to put much emphasis on 
dicta from more than a century ago to resolve the question of whether nonhumans could be
authors . . . .”).
92. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (emphasizing the word “original”).
93. Id.
94. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. 
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
95. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884).
96. See id. at 56.
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By [“]writings[”] in that clause is meant the literary 
productions of those authors, and congress very properly has 
declared these to include all forms of writing, printing, 
engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of 
the author are given visible expression. The only reason why 
photographs were not included in the extended list in the act 
of 1802 is probably that they did not exist, as photography, 
as an art was then unknown, and the scientific principle on 
which it rests, and the chemicals and machinery by which it 
is operated, have all been discovered long since that statute 
was enacted. 
. . . . 
We entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad 
enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, 
so far as they are representatives of original intellectual 
conceptions of the author.97
Therefore, Burrow-Giles stands for the proposition that the original 
aspects of a photograph are copyrightable.98 While the Copyright Office 
requires a human to make the original choices,99 the Court in Burrow-
Giles never addressed that issue.100 Rather, the Court focused on 
originality,101 as in Trade-Mark Cases,102 which indicates that as long as 
the choices made by the autonomous artificial intelligence are original 
enough—“writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc.”103—the resulting 
photograph should be copyrightable.
Moreover, the Court in Burrow-Giles stated that the reason 
photographs had not been included in the then Copyright Act was because 
photographs had not existed,104 and unless they could be distinguished 
                                                                                                                     
97. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
98. See id.
99. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306 (“[T]he Office will refuse to register 
a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the work.” (emphasis added)).
100. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 54, 56, 58.
101. See id. at 60 (holding for plaintiff only after noting that “the photograph in 
question . . . is a ‘useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and . . . plaintiff 
made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible 
form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, 
draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present 
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired 
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, 
he produced the picture in suit’” (third omission in original)).
102. See supra text accompanying note 92.
103. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
104. See id. (“The only reason why photographs were not included in the extended list in the 
act of 1802 is probably that they did not exist, as photography, as an art, was then unknown, and 
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from what was then copyrightable (for example, maps, charts, and 
designs) they should be similarly copyrightable.105 In other words, the 
Court instructed for the word “writings” to be interpreted in light of 
current technologies and practices.106 Under a similar analysis, the word 
“authors” must include autonomous artificial intelligence. The reason 
autonomous artificial intelligence has not been included in the Copyright 
Act is because such technology has never existed, and unless works made 
by such machines can be distinguished from works created by what is 
now deemed an author (that is, humans) their works should be similarly 
copyrightable. Therefore, the Office’s broad ban against nonhuman 
authorship is antiquated in light of Burrow-Giles.
In sum, because the Copyright Office’s Human Authorship 
Requirement is ambiguous and antiquated with regards to works made by 
autonomous artificial intelligence, the requirement fails to properly 
address them.
III. POSSIBLE CHOICES: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EACH 
APPROACH
Because there is no proper guidance from Congress, the federal courts, 
or the Copyright Office as to who would own the copyright of a work 
made by autonomous artificial intelligence, an analysis of all reasonable 
copyright allocations is required. This Part analyzes the arguments for 
and against each approach, and it separates them into three categories: (1) 
the artificial intelligence as copyright owner; (2) the user, programmer, 
or artificial intelligence company as copyright owner; and (3) immediate 
entrance into the public domain. It concludes that the best choice is 
immediate entrance into the public domain.
A. The Artificial Intelligence as Copyright Owner
The first approach is allocating copyright ownership to the artificial 
intelligence itself by defining the term “author” to include artificial 
intelligence.107 In effect, this argument seeks to amend § 101 of the 
Copyright Act to the following:
                                                                                                                     
the scientific principle on which it rests, and the chemicals and machinery by which it is operated, 
have all been discovered long since that statute was enacted.”).
105. See id. at 57 (“Unless, therefore, photographs can be distinguished in the classification 
on this point from the maps, charts, designs, engravings, etchings, cuts, and other prints, it is 
difficult to see why Congress cannot make them the subject of copyright as well as the others.”).
106. See id.
107. See Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 J. FRANKLIN 
PIERCE CTR. INTELL. PROP. 431, 440–41 (2017).
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An “author” may be a natural person or a computer for 
purposes of this Act.
As previously mentioned, the Copyright Act grants a copyright for an 
“original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,”108 yet it defines neither “authorship” nor “author.”109 The 
argument for this approach states that as long as the requirements of 
originality and fixation—“the two ‘fundamental criteria of copyright 
protection’”—are met, the copyright should be granted to the creating 
entity.110
As for originality, the law is settled that a minimal amount of 
originality will suffice regardless of the artistic merit.111 In Alfred Bell & 
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,112 the court noted that
nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted 
matter be strikingly unique or novel. . . . All that is needed 
to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 
“author” contributed something more than a “merely trivial”
variation, something recognizably “his own.” Originality in 
this context “means little more than a prohibition of actual 
copying.” No matter how poor artistically the “author’s”
addition, it is enough if it be his own.
. . . .
[E]ven if [the author’s] substantial departures from the 
paintings were inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A
copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock 
caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently 
distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation 
unintentionally, the “author” may adopt it as his and 
copyright it.113
Therefore, a work is original unless it is an exact copy of something 
else.114 Because the artificial intelligence at issue do not merely copy 
                                                                                                                     
108. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
109. Id. § 101.
110. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1197, 1199 (quoting H.R. REP NO. 1476, at 51 (1976)).
111. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 2.01[B][1].
112. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
113. Id. at 102–05 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 
F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) and then quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31 
F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
114. See id. at 103.
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another’s work,115 the resulting works are sure to meet the low standard 
of originality.116
As for fixation, the Copyright Act states that the work must be “fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”117
In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Dirkschneider,118 a video-game 
manufacturer brought suit alleging copyright infringement.119 The 
defendant argued, among other things, that the copyrights on the
videogames were invalid for lack of fixation.120 The court disagreed:
Under [the Copyright Act], it is clear that the plaintiff’s
audiovisual works are fixed in the printed circuit boards. The 
printed circuit boards are tangible objects from which the 
audiovisual works may be perceived for a period of time 
more than transitory. The fact that the audiovisual works 
cannot be viewed without a machine does not mean the 
works are not fixed.121
Therefore, a work is fixed when it is on readable electronic 
hardware.122 Because works created by artificial intelligence can be 
stored in a computer’s memory and computer memory can be read using 
a computer, such works are fixed.123 In sum, because the works created 
by artificial intelligence are able to meet the two statutory requirements 
of originality and fixation, the argument goes, they ought to be the owners 
of the resulting copyright.124
The main arguments against this approach are standing125 and wasted 
incentive.126 First, as previously mentioned, only humans have standing
under the Copyright Act.127 Granting standing to artificial intelligence 
                                                                                                                     
115. See supra notes 33–58 and accompanying text.
116. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
118. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
119. Id. at 472.
120. Id. at 479.
121. Id. at 480.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199 (“Machines may be capable of exhibiting 
sufficient originality to qualify for copyright, and may be able to express that originality in a 
tangible form. What basis, then, would there be for denying a copyright to a computer?”).
125. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 441.
126. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
127. See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
28, 2016) (“The issue for me is whether Next Friends have demonstrated that the Copyright Act 
confers standing upon [an animal]. In light of the plain language of the Copyright Act, past judicial 
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would lead to many unsettling questions: Who enforces the right? What 
remedies should artificial intelligence be granted? What other rights 
should artificial intelligence receive?128 Although these questions may 
one day have to be answered, there is currently no pressing need because 
sentient artificial intelligence has yet to come.129 Second, the Patent and 
Copyright Clause makes clear that copyright law was established to 
incentivize people to create works by offering them exclusive rights,130
thereby “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”131
Currently, computers need no incentive to create; they merely require 
electricity to create.132 Thus, the financial incentive that results from a 
copyright would be meaningless to a computer.133
In sum, while an autonomous artificial intelligence might be the 
statutory creator of its work under the Copyright Act, allocating the 
copyright to the artificial intelligence would result in overwhelming and 
unnecessary legal uncertainty, and it would be contrary to the goal of the 
Patent and Copyright Clause.
B. The User, Programmer, or Artificial Intelligence Company as
Copyright Owner
The second approach is allocating copyright ownership to the user, 
programmer, or artificial intelligence company by expanding the “work 
for hire” doctrine. Under the Copyright Act, copyright ownership initially 
vests in the author.134 However, in the case of a “work made for hire,” 
ownership is transferred to the “employer.”135 Currently, a work is a 
“work made for hire” either when it is created by an employee or when, 
among other things, it is commissioned.136 This argument seeks to add a 
third condition that includes works created by artificial intelligence.137
Special copyright ownership provisions exist for “computer-
generated” works in the United Kingdom,138 New Zealand,139 and 
                                                                                                                     
interpretations of the Act’s authorship requirement, and guidance from the Copyright Office, they 
have not.”), aff’d, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
128. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 441.
129. See Abbott, supra note 19, at 1114.
130. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
132. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
133. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 444.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
135. Id. § 201(b).
136. Id. § 101.
137. See Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent 
Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 26 (2012).
138. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (U.K.).
139. See Copyright Act of 1994, § 5(2)(a) (N.Z.).
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Ireland.140 There, “computer-generated” works are defined as works 
generated by computer where there is no human author.141 Ownership for 
such works is allocated to “the person by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”142 Using this 
framework, this argument seeks to amend the definition of “work made 
for hire” to include the definition of “computer-generated.”143 More 
specifically, this argument seeks to amend § 101 of the Copyright Act to 
the following:
A “work made for hire” is—
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his 
or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a 
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional 
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if 
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by 
them that the work shall be considered a work made for 
hire. . . . ; or
(3) a work generated by a computer in circumstances such 
that there is no human author of the work.144
With this amendment, copyright ownership for works created by 
artificial intelligence would vest in the “employer.”145 Determining the 
“employer” in any given case—between the user, the programmer, and 
artificial intelligence company—would be a question of fact likely 
determined under agency law.146
                                                                                                                     
140. See Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, pt. II, ch. 2, § 21(f) (Act No. 28/2000) (Ir.).
141. See Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, pt. I, § 2 (Act. No. 28/2000) (Ir.); Copyright 
Act 1994, § 2 (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 178 (U.K.).
142. Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, pt. II, ch. 2, § 21(f) (Act. No. 28/2000) (Ir.); 
Copyright Act 1994, § 5(2)(a) (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) 
(U.K.).
143. See Bridy, supra note 137, at 27. 
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Bridy, supra note 137, at 27.
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
146. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740–41 (1989) (holding 
that the term “employee” with respect to a “work made for hire” must be interpreted under agency 
law). However, some commentators argue that courts would need to move away from this 
approach with respect to artificial intelligence. See, e.g., Hristov, supra note 107, at 442 (“An
amendment of the Copyright Act . . . must diverge from the current agency law approach used to
categorize the relationship between an employee and employer . . . .”). Factors could include the 
amount of user interaction required, which entity provides the required computational power, and 
whether access to the artificial intelligence is free of charge. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 
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There are several advantages to this approach. First, this approach 
would reward users, programmers, and artificial intelligence companies 
for the fruits of their labor.147 Second, it would incentivize them to 
disclose any contribution by artificial intelligence in the creative process, 
where they may otherwise withhold this information due to fear of 
rejection during copyright registration.148 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the artificial intelligence market would benefit from the 
incentives.149
However, there are issues with each of these benefits. First, this 
approach would over-reward users, programmers, and companies.150 The 
purpose of copyright law is to reward the “original intellectual 
conceptions of the author,”151 thereby “promot[ing] the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”152 For this reason, a programmer may rightfully 
obtain a copyright for the code behind artificial intelligence;153 on the 
other hand, a parent may not receive a copyright for the artistic works of 
his or her child.154 The contribution by the user, programmer, and 
company is akin to that of parents: They aid in the conception of the entity 
that creates the work, rather than creating the work themselves. Thus, 
they would be rewarded despite not contributing to the intellectual 
conception of the work, contrary to the purpose of copyright law. 
Moreover, they could “own everything the program was capable of 
generating” by merely allowing the computer to run indefinitely.155 Thus, 
they would be over-rewarded with an unlimited number of works 
                                                                                                                     
1202–04 (arguing that users should be granted the copyright because they cause the work to be 
generated, polish the raw output, and buy or license the program).
147. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1205 (acknowledging that “[t]he computer, after all, 
simply follows the instructions of the programmer” and that “it is fair to reward the programmer 
for the value attributable to this fruit of his intellectual labor, even though it may be fruit he had 
not envisioned”).
148. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 450.
149. Cf. id. at 444–45 (arguing that programmers and companies should be granted copyright 
ownership because otherwise “society would likely see a significant decline in AI generated works 
and a decline in the overall development of the AI industry”); Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1227 
(arguing that users should be granted copyright ownership because, much like traditional authors, 
“they are in the best position to take the initial steps that will bring a work into the marketplace”).
150. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1207–08 (arguing that granting the programmer 
copyright ownership would “over-reward[] the programmer”).
151. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
153. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It is 
now well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes, 
are the subject of copyright protection.”).
154. Cf. Abbott, supra note 19, at 1094–95 (“No one would exist without their parents 
contributing to their conception . . . but that does not make parents inventors on their child’s 
patents.”).
155. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1208.
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produced at an unprecedented rate. Finally, they would be fully rewarded 
even if they were not granted a copyright: the user would be able to freely 
use or build upon the work created by the autonomous artificial 
intelligence; the programmer would enhance his or her reputation and 
professional desirability;156 and the artificial intelligence company would 
benefit from the sales, licensing, and advertisement revenues.157
Therefore, this approach would over-reward users, programmers, and 
companies.
Second, honesty in copyright registration should be required, rather 
than hoped for. A sensible approach would be to require proof of 
conception for owners and users of artificial intelligence. And if the 
applicant knowingly omitted proof of conception or the fact that he or she 
owns or uses artificial intelligence—which could be discovered, for 
example, during litigation—then the copyright should be invalidated. 
This framework would provide a strong incentive for honesty.
Finally, while this approach could increase the market for artificial 
intelligence, it could also lead to access inequality. Under this approach, 
the “employer” of the artificial intelligence becomes the copyright 
owner.158 Therefore, enticed with the highly lucrative opportunity of 
obtaining copyrights at an unprecedented rate, artificial intelligence 
companies may decide to hoard access to autonomous artificial 
intelligence, so as to always remain the “employers” and thus the 
copyright owners. This would mean that only a handful of software 
giants,159 in only a handful of countries,160 would have access to this 
technology. Commentators strongly warn about this type of access 
inequality, with one report from Stanford University stating that “AI 
could widen existing inequalities of opportunity if access to AI 
                                                                                                                     
156. See Abbott, supra note 19, at 1106 (arguing that programmers have noneconomic 
reasons to build creative computers, including “to enhance their reputations, satisfy scientific 
curiosity, or collaborate with peers”).
157. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1207 (“By keeping the program to himself and 
copyrighting every piece of music . . . that the program generates, the programmer would be able 
to prevent others from obtaining interests in the program’s output. If he does this, of course, the 
programmer will not make any money directly from the program, although he may profit from 
selling the output that the program generates. Thus, the programmer has a choice, and should not 
complain about the consequences of his choice to market the program.”).
158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
159. Cf. Who Is Winning the AI Race?, MIT TECH. REV. (June 27, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608112/who-is-winning-the-ai-race/ [https://perma.cc/
ER3M-9MEY] (reporting a wide gap between the activity of the three leading artificial 
intelligence companies—Microsoft, Google, and IBM—and any other competing company).
160. Cf. Brian O’Keefe & Nicolas Rapp, Here Are 50 Companies Leading the AI Revolution,
FORTUNE (Feb. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/23/artificial-intelligence-companies/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZLB6-D3J5] (reporting that the top fifty artificial intelligence companies in the 
world are located in only six different countries).
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technologies . . . is unfairly distributed across society” because “[t]hese 
technologies will improve the abilities and efficiency of people who have 
access to them.”161 Thus, because this approach could foster a grab-all
environment, it could result in access inequality, which commentators 
point out as one of the greatest concerns regarding artificial intelligence.
In sum, this approach would over-reward users, programmers, and 
companies, and it could lead to unequal access to artificial intelligence.
C. Immediate Entrance Into the Public Domain
The final approach is the work’s immediate entrance into the public 
domain, whereby no copyright is granted, and everyone is free to use the 
artificial intelligence’s work. According to this argument, because no 
person generates the artificial intelligence’s work, no person should be 
awarded the copyright.162 In effect, this argument seeks to amend 
§ 201(a) of the Copyright Act to the following:
(a) Initial Ownership.—
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially 
in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint
work are coowners of copyright in the work. No copyright 
shall be granted for works generated by a computer in 
circumstances such that there is no human author of the 
work.163
With this amendment, no copyright would be granted for works created 
by artificial intelligence.164
The biggest argument against this approach is lost incentive for 
programmers and artificial intelligence companies.165 However, any loss 
                                                                                                                     
161. PETER STONE ET AL., STANFORD UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030:
ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 43 (2016), https://ai100.stanford.
edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf [https://perma.cc/97JB-CSR2].
162. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1224 (“If there is no human author of the computer-
generated work, the intellectual property system has assumed no one deserves to be rewarded for 
it.”).
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). This added language is borrowed from the definition of 
“computer-generated” in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Ireland. See supra notes 138–
41 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (arguing that a work created by artificial 
intelligence is “a work generated by a computer in circumstances such that there is no human 
author of the work”).
165. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1225–26 (“[T]he legislature, the executive branch, 
and the courts seem to strongly favor maximizing intellectual property rewards, especially for 
high technology innovators. . . . For some, the very notion of output being in the public domain 
may seem to be an anathema, a temporary inefficient situation that will be much improved when 
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would likely be offset by other factors. First, as discussed earlier, the user, 
programmer, and companies would be fully rewarded despite a lack of 
copyright.166 Moreover, as Judge Posner once stated, innovation in the 
software industry is “often incremental, quickly superseded, and less 
costly to develop, and innovators have a significant first-mover 
advantage.”167 Therefore, the artificial intelligence industry is likely to 
continue flourishing regardless of copyrights—as it has until now—
because of the incentives inherent to the artificial intelligence industry. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a fierce international race 
as to which country will lead humanity into the age of artificial 
intelligence. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, has called 
artificial intelligence the “future . . . of all of mankind,” stating that 
“[w]hoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the 
world.”168 This race means that artificial intelligence research is likely to
continue, with or without copyrights, as a matter of national pride and 
policy. In sum, there is little reason to believe that immediate entrance 
into the public domain would lead to any significant loss in incentives for 
programmers and artificial intelligence companies.
However, an argument can be made that all possible incentives should 
be given to programmers and companies to develop artificial intelligence 
for producing the “best” creative works, much like incentives should be 
given for finding the best discoveries in the scientific fields. Nevertheless, 
this argument is unpersuasive. For a scientific endeavor, such as antibody 
sequencing for cancer therapy,169 it seems reasonable to maximize every 
possible incentive for programmers and companies to develop artificial 
intelligence for finding the best cancer therapy.170 After all, humanity as 
a whole would benefit from such a cure. On the other hand, in creative 
fields there is no need to promote, for example, the creation of every 
                                                                                                                     
individual property rights are recognized. Rights must be given to someone, argue those who hold 
this view; the question is to whom to give rights, not whether to give them at all.”). 
166. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
167. Ryan Abbott, Hal the Inventor: Big Data and Its Use by Artificial Intelligence, in BIG 
DATA IS NOT A MONOLITH 187, 195 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al. eds., 2016).
168. Radina Gigova, Who Vladimir Putin Thinks Will Rule the World, CNN (Sept. 2, 2017,
1:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/01/world/putin-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-
world/index.html [https://perma.cc/TU65-HNY5].
169. Cf. Abbott, supra note 19, at 1118 (explaining how artificial intelligence could sequence 
antibodies for therapeutic purposes).
170. Such a cure is not difficult to envision, especially given the breakthroughs in cancer 
treatments due to recent technological advances. See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Biotech’s Coming 
Cancer Cure, MIT TECH. REV. (June 18, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538441/
biotechs-coming-cancer-cure/ [https://perma.cc/HG6K-HD3T] (discussing biotechnological 
“treatments [that] work by removing molecular brakes that normally keep the body’s T cells from 
seeing cancer as an enemy, and [which] have helped demonstrate that the immune system is 
capable of destroying cancer”). 
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possible painting. There is simply no objective, humanitarian goal. For 
creative works, “[q]uality does trump quantity in every way.”171
Therefore, there is no need to give programmers and companies every 
possible incentive to develop artificial intelligence for creative works.
Finally, this approach provides a unique benefit: fostering cooperation 
between artificial intelligence and humans in the creative fields. Many 
fear that advances in artificial intelligence will lead to an increase in 
unemployment,172 and some scholars have pointed to advances in 
technology as the cause of the increasing unemployment documented 
since the dawn of the millennium.173 Much like automation during the 
Industrial Revolution displaced those who worked in agriculture,174
artificial intelligence is estimated to displace roughly half of all jobs in 
the United States in the near future.175 Indeed, some commentators call 
the rise of artificial intelligence the “4th Industrial Revolution” due to 
these predictions.176 World-renowned physicist Stephen Hawking went
as far as stating that “[t]he development of full artificial intelligence could 
                                                                                                                     
171. Michael Kaiser, Is It Quantity or Quality That Counts in the Arts?, HUFFINGTON POST,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-kaiser/is-it-quantity-or-quality_b_859278.html
[https://perma.cc/L5KM-RYTT] (last updated July 9, 2011).
172. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 19, at 1117 (“With the expansion of computers into 
creative domains previously occupied only by people, machines threaten to displace human 
inventors.”).
173. See, e.g., David Rotman, How Technology Is Destroying Jobs, MIT TECH. REV. (June 
12, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/515926/how-technology-is-destroying-jobs/ 
[https://perma.cc/MTU6-6PUY] (“In economics, productivity—the amount of economic value 
created for a given unit of input, such as an hour of labor—is a crucial indicator of growth and 
wealth creation. It is a measure of progress. . . . For years after World War II, the two lines closely 
tracked each other, with increases in jobs corresponding to increases in productivity. The pattern 
is clear: as businesses generated more value from their workers, the country as a whole became 
richer, which fueled more economic activity and created even more jobs. Then, beginning in 2000, 
the lines diverge; productivity continues to rise robustly, but employment suddenly wilts. By 
2011, a significant gap appears between the two lines, showing economic growth with no parallel 
increase in job creation. Brynjolfsson and McAfee call it the ‘great decoupling.’ And Brynjolfsson 
says he is confident that technology is behind both the healthy growth in productivity and the 
weak growth in jobs.”).
174. See id. (“At least since the Industrial Revolution began in the 1700s, improvements in 
technology have changed the nature of work and destroyed some types of jobs in the process. In 
1900, 41 percent of Americans worked in agriculture; by 2000, it was only 2 percent.”). 
175. See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future Of Employment: How 
Susceptible Are Jobs To Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 265 
(2017) (“According to our estimate, 47% of total US employment is in the high risk category, 
meaning that associated occupations are potentially automatable over some unspecified number 
of years, perhaps a decade or two.”).
176. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, The 4th Industrial Revolution And A Jobless Future - A Good 
Thing?, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/03/03/the-4th-
industrial-revolution-and-a-jobless-future-a-good-thing/#ea1bb2b44a5e [https://perma.cc/R433-
4ACF].
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spell the end of the human race,”177 and Elon Musk, founder of Tesla 
Motors and SpaceX, has likewise compared artificial intelligence to 
“summoning [a] demon”178—and they are not alone.179 Regardless of 
labels, it is clear that artificial intelligence is likely to drastically change 
the employment landscape in the near future, and it is imperative to 
ensure that humans remain an integral part of fields that do not 
necessarily require complete automation—such as the creative fields.180
Immediate entrance into the public domain would help ensure just this. 
More specifically, human contribution would be required to obtain 
copyrights from the artificial intelligence’s raw output.181
In sum, immediate entrance into the public domain is the best 
approach to resolving the question of copyright ownership of works 
created by autonomous artificial intelligence. The artificial intelligence 
industry will likely continue to thrive regardless of copyrights, and this 
approach would help ensure that humans remain an integral part of 
creative fields.
CONCLUSION
The increasing sophistication and proliferation of artificial 
intelligence has given rise to a pressing question: Who is the copyright 
owner of a work created by autonomous artificial intelligence? Thus far, 
Congress has remained silent on the issue, federal courts have yet to face 
the question, and the little guidance provided by the Copyright Office is 
ambiguous and antiquated. Out of the possible choices, immediate 
entrance into the public domain is the best option.
Allocation of copyright ownership to the artificial intelligence would 
lead to nonhuman standing, which would lead to unnecessary uncertainty 
in the legal system. This would also lead to lost incentives, which is 
contrary to the goals of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution. Likewise, allocation to the user, programmer, or artificial 
                                                                                                                     
177. Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540 [https://perma.cc/
EUV2-PSYW].
178. David Shukman, How Safe Can Artificial Intelligence Be?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-34249500 [https://perma.cc/56UY-THLZ].
179. See, e.g., Dion Dassanayake, Bill Gates Joins Stephen Hawking in Warning Artificial 
Intelligence Is a Threat to Mankind, EXPRESS (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.express.co.uk/
news/world/555092/Bill-Gates-Stephen-Hawking-Artificial-Intelligence-AI-threat-mankind
[https://perma.cc/ZV46-6WV3] (noting that Microsoft founder Bill Gates agrees with Stephen 
Hawkins and Elon Musk regarding the dangers of artificial intelligence).
180. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no need to 
maximize every possible incentive for developing artificial intelligence for the creative fields).
181. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (noting that, under this approach, a 
work created by artificial intelligence would enter the public domain only when there is a lack of 
human contribution).
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intelligence company would lead to over-rewarding, and it could lead to 
unequal access to artificial intelligence. On the other hand, immediate 
entrance into the public domain would ensure that the users, 
programmers, and companies are adequately rewarded, and it would 
ensure that humans remain an integral part of the creative fields.
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